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Network operators gradually open their interfaces to formerly hidden services that foster the development of a new class of 
mobile applications which are operated by 3rd party providers and take into account context information such as the user’s 
location. As a result, the inclusion of the network operators’ infrastructure provides many new possibilities and the potential 
to change the way in which mobile devices are used in everyday life. However, this development raises important issues such 
as the protection of the users location information and privacy while using location-based services. In this paper we illustrate 
a service architecture together with a novel and flexible privacy enhancing mechanism that allows the realization of the 
highly postulated pay-as-you-go model for location-based services. We further specify mobile applications that operate on 
the exchange of location information even between different network operators while still meeting mandatory legal 
requirements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While only a decade ago the focus of legislation was on the protection of privacy, it has over the past years dramatically 
shifted towards enabling law enforcement access to data collections and towards preventing violent and economic crime. 
Recently, the intensified public and scientific discussions worldwide, primarily those regarding the possible abuse of 
collected data, have led to a widespread loss of consumer trust in distributed IT systems that are vital for an effective law 
enforcement and for an efficient economy. Typically, these discussions revolve around the safeguarding of data in banking 
systems (The Financial Crime Branch - HM Treasury 2002; Lichtblau, 2006), airline passenger information systems 
(European Digital Rights, 2006) and international financial transaction systems, such as SWIFT (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), 2007). While the collected information is important in certain contexts, it is also increasing the exposure 
of individuals to abuse. The widespread sloppyness in the handling of personal data by different industry sectors and by some 
government agencies in the US and Europe has increased the reluctance of consumers and citizens to provide any other 
information than what they are obliged to by law or the bare minimum required for a purchase or for access to a service. 
There even is a tendency to abandon the use of services that lead to the collection of larger amounts of personal data. At the 
same time compliance requirements on companies and government agencies are growing, resulting in a situation where they 
are caught in between the necessity to collect more and more data to fulfill these requirements and an increasing reluctance of 
consumers and citizens to provide personal information. A very typical representative of this increasingly problematic 
situation is the latest legislation which European mobile phone operators are currently confronted with. While it is highly 
desirable to better support law enforcement agencies in their efforts to prevent serious crime, the cost of the systems for 
businesses and the fears of consumers are steadily growing. It has in some cases reached a level at which consumers refuse 
new services out of fear the data possibly collected about them through the services might be open to abuse. As an abundance 
of cases has shown, this fear is not unjustified. With a steady stream of serious blunders being reported in the media, it is 
obvious that consumers and citizens are starting to distrust IT-based products and services. An uneasy feeling that has 
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previously been limited to the Internet is now mobile end user devices and navigation systems. The legal obligation to collect 
data and store it for a certain amount of time is reinforcing the already negative attitude of consumers and citizens. 
The increasing legal and commercial pressure on operators 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the worst affected industry sectors are the providers of mobile services. The 
European Data Retention Directive (EU, 2006) does for example clearly state that Member States of the European Union are 
obliged to introduce legislation that forces service providers to retain highly personal data, such as the origin and the 
destination of all outgoing or incoming connections and their duration. With this information the complete communication 
profile of a person can be built, including all telephone and e-mail contacts. While this information is an extremely valuable 
base for law enforcement officers investigating criminal networks, it gives innocent users the feeling of their lives being 
monitored permanently. From the recording of connection headers (e.g. called numbers, email recipients, and server logins) 
and the duration of a phone call to the recording and analysis of the content of a communication it is only a small step. For 
service operators this means a twofold challenge, because they are being burdened with the collection, storage and making 
available of this information to law enforcement officers, while at the same time having to assure the safeguarding of this 
information against unauthorized access. Consequently, the already existing challenges of protecting personal data at the 
level prescribed by legislation such as the European Data Protection Directive (EU, 1995) are multiplied. Some of the 
nightmare scenarios for a mobile phone operator would be the unauthorized access to the collected data and the abuse of this 
data by own staff or by law enforcement officers who get authorized access.  
The outcome is a double challenge: While the resulting investments in the affected mobile phone operators systems are 
considerable and do therefore increase the commercial pressure in an already highly competitive market, consumers do at the 
same time become reluctant to use new services out of fear that their personal data might be abuse. The way out of such a 
vicious situation can only come via an approach that enables the operator to fulfill the imposed legal requirements while at 
the same time providing a level of anonymity that makes the user feel safe enough. 
Some of the major challenges an operator is confronted with and interesting questions an operator needs to answer are:  
• Organizational challenges, conflicting goals in different areas of legislation, implementation cost, technological 
challenges. 
• Analysis of and planning for expected and unexpected new legislation, implementation, operation of solutions. 
o Can and should a solid framework for dealing with the coming challenges be built? 
o Is an adequate process in place? 
o Requirements modeling, requirements tracking, development, implementation and operation. 
• The need for appropriate organizational and technological solutions is quite obvious.  
• Anonymity will soon be gone completely. Does pseudonymity help in the light of rapidly vanishing consumer trust? 
 
As the full implementation of data retention legislation in Europe is not too far away, these questions need to be dealt with 
more urgently than some of the operators are aware of.  
Interfaces towards 3rd Party Application Providers 
One strategy network operators face to hold against the constantly growing market pressure is to provide interfaces to allow 
access to previously hidden services such as location, messaging or presence services to name only a few. To enable service 
providers to access network operators’ services fosters the development of large-scale context-aware applications. The most 
prevailing subset of this kind of applications is also known as location-based services. They build the focus in this paper. 
Regarding open network interfaces, the standardization efforts of the Parlay (2008) group represent one example that aims to 
promote the use of network service operators’ resources. However, interfaces that bring together the formerly separate 
telecommunications and Internet worlds also introduce new risks. Even worse, bringing together these two different worlds 
means that operators have to cope with a different scale of complexity and possible threats that multiply each other. As a 
result, these new kinds of threats are likely to be worse than if these domains remained separated. One decisive question that 
has to be considered is how to provide adequate privacy protection for users, the associated data and system components. In 
order to better understand the risks users and especially network service operators have to anticipate, we continue the 
discussion by illustrating the core privacy principles and concepts that are necessary for the sucessful realization and 
implementation of location-based services and applications. 
Privacy Concepts 
The notion of privacy is hard to define and there is probably no clear answer to the question what privacy actually is. 
Nevertheless, there are different definitions of privacy that reflect the different aspects such as the context and environment. 
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Toronto, ON, Canada August 14th-17th 2008 2 
Jorns and Quichmayr  Cross Domain Privacy Protection for Location-Based Services 
In this respect (Electronic Privacy Information Centre EPIC, 2008) mentions one writer’s statement „in one sense, all human 
rights are aspects of the right to privacy“. Meanwhile there are four different privacy concepts identified. These concepts are 
not self-contained but rather interrelated and include: 
• Information Privacy: regards all means that are necessary to provide rules that govern the collection and handling of 
personal data also referred to as Sensitive Personal Data by the Data Protection Act (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
1998) and includes credit information, medical and government records as well as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions 
and religious believes to name only a few. The sum of all these rules and activities is also known as Data Protection. 
• Bodily Privacy: concerns the protection of people’s physical selves against invasive procedures such as genetic tests, drug 
testing and cavity searches 
• Privacy in Communication: covers the security and privacy of mail, telephones, email and other forms of communications  
• Territorial Privacy: concerns the setting of limits on intrusion into the domestic and other environments such as the 
workplace or public space. This includes searches, video surveillance and ID checks. 
In the course of the discussion about privacy (Penders, 2004) excludes Privacy of Communication and Bodily Privacy from 
further discussion since his aim is rather to explain privacy in the light of (mobile) telecommunication services which reflects 
our aim quite well. Thus, we also exclude these two concepts from further discussions and concentrate rather on Information 
Privacy, which also covers the confidentiality of traffic data. 
Beside the transmitted content data, communication in mobile networks also generates so-called traffic data that directs the 
content from a sender to the receiver and enables the communication. In telecommunication systems traffic data is also called 
signaling-data. It controls communications in telecommunication networks. This includes the establishment and control of a 
communication connection and the management thereof. 
Another important aspect with respect to traffic data is location data. It represents indispensable information for the operation 
of today's mobile networks. Every mobile device that connects to a network first determines the base station of which the 
received signal strength is the best. If the holder of the mobile device moves it switches from one base station to another. This 
is called handover. Since every base station has a certain position, the location of each connected mobile device is known by 
the network operator. The location information is stored in a central database called home location register (HLR). The 
European Union defines location data as follows „location data means any data processed in an electronic communictions 
network, indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available electronic 
communicaiton service.“ which describes the aforementioned technical aspects in telecommunications systems quite well. 
PRIVACY RESEARCH FOR LOCATION-BASED SERVICES 
Today, location information forms the basis for many commercial location-based services and applications. In the US market 
the driving force for this development was the E911 mandate. It obliges network operators to provide location information 
within certain time in case of emergency. Whereas the E911 finds general approval, most people are sceptical or even 
mistrust in technologies of commercial location-based services (Barkhuus and Day, 2003). However, studies show that some 
of the people who were initially concerned about revealing thir location may change their mind and finally reveal their 
location information to almost everyone (Barkhuus, 2004). It is obvious that in any case reasonable solutions are required to 
guarantee users that their location and real world identity are sufficiently protected, even if they are not aware of any possible 
threat. The implementation of privacy measures may also reduce costs through data reduction that in turn can be made visible 
to users and result in a higher loyalty of customers. 
Research in the field of privacy for location-based services has originated a number of solutions that aim at giving users 
control over who they allow to receive their actual location information. A basic classification leads solutions such as those 
proposed by (Gruteser and Grunwald, 2003; Yee, 2005) with a focus on the definition, distribution and enforcement of 
privacy policies. Other solutions such as proposed by (Cheng, 2006) is based on the concept of k-anonymity and tries to 
enhance the users privacy by cloaking or blurring location information through reducing the resolution of provided data in 
space and time. 
The solution we present in this paper is based on pseudonyms that veil the real identity of users towards service providers. In 
the following we continue with a discussion about pseudonyms, show how the pseudonym generation scheme works and 
explain how users may query the system by the use of pseudonyms. Furthermore, we demonstrate the exchange of sensitive 
location information over the boundaries of the network providers without privacy interferrence. These questions are 
currently one of the most challenging issues designers of location-based systems face. Finally, we give an overview about the 
current implementation of the system.  
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Protection of Real World Identities with Pseudonyms 
Depending on the requested service by the users, we distinguish two kinds of pseudonyms. One identifies the user who is at 
the same time the requester, the second kind of pseudonyms is used to denote another person, those in the buddy list. 
Technically, both kinds of pseudonyms are equal. 
 
Figure 1. System Architecture and Pseudonym Generation Scheme 
The use of pseudonyms allows abstracting from any information that could unveil the identity of a mobile user. However, 
this also imposes some requirements that have to be considered carefully. The most important one is that the use of static or 
long-term pseudonyms cannot provide sufficient privacy protection. In this respect, even if different static pseudonyms are 
used for different applications, it is still possible to unveil the respective identity of users (Beresford A.R. and Stajano F., 
2003). 
To provide sufficient privacy protection the use of changing pseudonyms is obligatory. Our scheme allows the generation of 
chains of pseudonyms. Each single pseudonym in a chain distinguishes from its successor and further from any other 
pseudonym generated by any other chain. Figure 1 shows two tables, one contains the chain of hash values that are generated 
by the client whereas the other table shows the correspoinding chain that is administered by the network operator’s privacy 
service. For each request, the respective next pseudonym hn+1 is generated and sent to the application. The distinction whether 
the user sends a self-identifying pseudonym, only a single or a list of pseudonyms where each one denotes a particular buddy 
is, from the applications point of view, obsolete. From a technical point of view all pseudonyms are generated equally. The 
the application cannot deduce the underyilng real world identity from any received pseudonym. 
In the example depicted in Figure 1, the user sends only one hash value h1, which, in this case, denotes one certain buddy. 
Upon receipt the network operators’ location service forwards the pseudonym to the privacy service which first checks the 
validity and then translates it. Therefore, the privacy service first looks in the database if it finds the received pseudonym. 
Each pseudonym is linked to one or several user identifiers. In the case when the location service sends the requests, the 
privacy service returns the associated MSISDN(s) of the particular user(s). Now, the privacy service computes the respective 
next pseudonym h2 = HMAC(h1, pwA) and stores it in the database.  
For long-term localisaiton processes, the privacy service further creates and stores a sessionID. This is also stored by all the 
other involved services such as e.g. the location service and the application. It allows assigning incoming location updates to 
anonymized users. Finally, for long-term processes also the client receives the sessionID, which enables him to later 
terminate the process and prevent that they run forever.  
Beside the capability to administer sessions, users can also send their location information directly to the location service. 
Therefore, the location service relates the MSISDNs with the actual position of the users. Apart from that, users initiate 
location updates in the same way as it is done for service requests, as part of message updateLocation(.). For security reasons, 
pseudonyms that are identified as other than self-identifying are blocked.  
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Figure 2. Location update and single location request across different network domains 
Depending on the respective localization strategy at hand, the location service may switch between different modes to 
improve the freshness and accuracy of the location information. Finally, as soon as the location of some user changes the 
location service sends asynchronous location updates to the application. In case of long-term sessions, the location service 
queries the position of each involved user that is administered under the particular session and then sends a list of coodinate 
pairs to the application. As depicted in Figure 1, asynchronous messages contain the session identifier and the coordinate 
pairs of each particular user. Therewith it is guaranteed that the application has no more information than continuous 
changing pseudonyms that cannot be linked to coordinate pairs.  
The whole service architecture, the pseudonym mechanism and the interworking of each single service that is based on this 
composition demonstrates only the case when all involved users share the same network operator. However, the most 
interesting setting is international roaming. In this context the growing fear of becoming victims of identity theft is one 
explanation why only few customers use advanced services and limit themselves to mere phone calls. Therefore, one focus of 
this paper is to look at a way how to establish a pseudonym-based privacy protection scheme that can operate in an 
environment that is dominated by distributed federated systems (Jøsang and Pope, 2005; Jøsang et al. 2005). 
EXCHANGE OF LOCATION INFORMATION OVER DIFFERENT NETWORK DOMAINS 
This section discusses how the proposed pseudonym generation mechanism can further be used to exchange location 
information even over different network operator domains. As an example we assume two different network operators, one in 
Australia and the other one in Europe. Figure 2 shows two users denoted as A and B. One is currently booked in the network 
domain of the Australian operator; the second one uses the Europan network. We further assume that user A roams in the 
Australian network and thus both, user A and B have the same European home network provider. Other constellations such 
as e.g. that the users not use different network operators but are within the same geographical area are conceivable. In our 
scenario user A is located in Australia but wants to provide his location to user B in Europe. A sends location information via 
the AU Application to the Australian location service. The publishLocation(.) request contains the user’s self identifying 
pseudonym hself and the domain information of her home network operator “nwop.eu”. The so-called application pseudonym 
happ in message 2 is a self-identifying pseudonym and allows the AU privacy service to identify the AU application. This is 
important to distinguish registered from unknown applications. Since the self-identifying pseudonym hself of user A cannot be 
translated by the AU privacy service but knows that her home operator is “nwop.eu”, it forwards the pseudonym hself as part 
of message 4 to the EU privacy service. 
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Figure 3. Periodic notifications about location updates across different network domains 
To avoid that subsequent location updates by user A require further verification and translation requests of pseudonyms for 
the AU privacy service, the EU privacy service notes that user A is served by the AU location service (see message 5). 
Therefore, an identifier indicates that the AU location service serves the location information of users on behalf of another 
domain. The identifier and the coordinates are stored together by the AU location service in message 7. In order to request the 
location of user B (getLocation(.)), message a. contains among the domain information the pseudonym hpres that denotes user 
A.  Upon receipt of message b. which contains additional information happ of the EU application, the EU location service 
requests for verification and translation of both pseudonyms from the EU privacy service. Since the location information is 
now served by the AU location service (message d.) the EU privacy service returns the identifier and the domain information 
of the responsible AU location service (message e.). Now, the EU location service receives the location information with the 
identifier (message f.) from the AU location service, which is then propagated back to user B.  
Long-term processes 
For long-term localization processes each clients, service and application is required to administer a session identifier. The 
use of sessions allows for notification of location changes even over different domains. Based on the previous explanations 
about how location information is exchanged over different domains for a single blocking getLocation(.) requests, we now 
discuss how location information is exchanged in the same environment for long-term localization processes. Messages 1 – 7 
depicted in Figure 3 are initiated by user A to update the current location. This procedure is equal to the messages already 
described in Figure 2. All subsequent messages (a. startPeriodicNotification(.)) initiate a long-time localization process for 
user B. Such processes are administered under a certain sessionID that is created by the respective privacy service. It is 
further propagated to the EU location service (message e) and as the AU location service receives the contact point for 
location updates from user A, the new session is now also administered by the AU location service. Messages g. and h. 
induce the update of the sessionID whereas by message i. the location information is sent to the EU location service. 
Subsequent location update notifications are only sent in case the location of a user changes. Finally, messages j. and k. 
deliver the location information to the application and inform user B about the sessionID it needs for the management of 
sessions. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
At this stage we have implemented the core services including the location and the privacy service. For the localisation of 
mobile devices we use a webservice interface provided by a local network operator. The whole middleware platform is 
implemented on a JBoss application server (JBoss.org, 2008). In order to be able to test mobile applications also with many 
users we extended the location service in such a way that it does not only query the network for the actual location of mobile 
devices but also provides recorded GPS locations that are stored in GPX (GPX, 2008) files. The left side of Figure 4 shows 
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four sessions with the user names and coordinates. The map on the right side shows the actual position of each user. The 
current implementation allows to manage multiple sessions, compareable to the situation when different mobile users start 
tracking sessions in parallel. Furthermore, by use of the pushlets-framework (Pushlets.com, 2008) for the location service, 
location changes are instantly updated by the browser (Jorns and Quirchmayr, 2008).  
 
Figure 4. Management Interface of the Location Tracking Platform 
Our implementation provides all described functions, such as asynchronous notifications about location changes, session 
management and the pseudonym functionality for privacy protection. However, the system provides only those functions that 
are needed to exchange location information within one domain but cannot handle handle cross-domain location exchange. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The protection of privacy becomes increasingly important because of a significant shift towards enabling law enforcement 
access to data collections. As a result mobile network service operators are currently in a controversy situation. The effort of 
law enforcement agencies to prevent crimes obliges mobile network service operators to collect more data of their customers 
which results in a situation where customers even start to refuse services. For network service operators the problem becomes 
even worse if they try to sell services such as location-based services that are generally considered as to be intrusive. To 
overcome these deficiencies the need for solutions that provide privacy is evident. In this paper we have proposed the use of a 
simple but effective privacy enhancing mechanism that is based on the notion of pseudonyms. It allows users to anonymously 
request services even from untrusted services without the need to reveal sensitive data. The proposed service architecture 
makes use of this pseudonym mechanism and at the same time allows the realization of the higly postulated pay-as-you-go 
model. Another important aspect we have considered in this paper is how to exchange location information of users across 
different network domains. To overcome typical constraints of existing proprietary Telco solutions, such as the inability to 
request location information of users that are either not subscribed to the same network operator or roaming, we propose an 
extension of our architecture that incorporates the use of pseudonyms and allows the implementation of location-based 
services over different network domains. This enables the worldwide use of the pay-as-you-go model.  
At this stage our system does not support the use of privacy policies that allow users to express certain decisions under which 
location data can be accessed, transmitted and processed by other parties. Hence, one of the next steps will be the extension 
of the privacy service by a definition of appropriate privacy policies as introduced in (Zeiss and Jorns, 2008). The current 
implementation of the system shows the feasibility of the underlying pseudonym generation scheme. The whole 
implementation is run in a virtual machine on a standard PC with 3.4GHz CPU. In the future we plan to extend the system by 
the proposed cross-domain aspects. Since the system resources are absolutely not exhausted so far we expect that once each 
service is operated on a dedicated server, the scalabilty and performance of the system will still be given, even if the number 
of users is very high. Of course, some critical services such as the location service will be subject to a critical analysis. 
Implementations for mobile devices will have to be evaluated with regard to performance and applicability.  
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